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# Politics and Faith: Who Will Put Humpty Dumpty Together Again?

*Hans Boersma*



*Hans Boersma  
is J.I. Packer  
Professor of  
Theology at Regent  
College.*

**T**he conference theme informing the essays of this *Crux* issue is “Politics and Faith in a Fractured World.” When I was asked to contribute to the conference, I was quite pleased with the theme; after all, it’s the kind of theme that allows speakers to say whatever they like on whatever topic they like. Each of the three main words in the title is suitably ambiguous. The first word is “politics.” Anybody who has been around knows there’s politics everywhere. There’s politics in the workplace, there’s politics in the church, there’s politics in Ottawa. Everything is politics, so it would seem. The second term, “faith,” is hardly less vague. It allows one to talk about faith commitments in general, about faith as it is reflected in each of the world’s religious traditions, or about the most dearly held convictions that any given individual may hold in today’s society. And the third term, too, is open to multiple angles. We live in a fractured world in the sense that we may be torn between family, research, teaching, speaking engagements, and so on. We live in a fractured world considering the at times grotesque social and economic inequalities in our society. The loss of social and cultural cohesion in Western society, something we often associate with the change from modernity to postmodernity, also implies a fractured world. And, as a Christian, I would want to say that the presence of sin since time immemorial means that everyone everywhere lives in a fractured world. My conclusion

was that the conference theme placed me, as a speaker, in a wonderful spot. “Politics,” “faith,” “fractured world”—I could define them as I liked, and I could speak about whatever my personal hobbyhorse happened to be.

Now, of course, I realized there were limits to my freedom. The reason the audience had come to the conference had, presumably, something to do with what they intuitively took the theme of the conference to refer to. People were willing to take time out of their schedule probably in part because they had a certain idea as to what the various speakers were going to be talking about in reference to “Politics and Faith in a Fractured World.” The reason for this, I suspect, is that when we think of “politics,” we think first and foremost of our common life together in the nation state. We think of federal politics in Ottawa or Washington, and we think of municipal and provincial governance. So, when we talk about the relationship between politics *and* faith, we tend to reflect on what our religious commitments have to do with the governance of the nation state—a topic that is of particular relevance since it is commonly understood that “faith” has to do with private commitments, while “politics” refers to public affairs. And so, in our contemporary Western society, the theme of “politics *and* faith” almost inevitably conjures up a fairly particular set of questions that have to do with the relationship between our religious commitments, largely considered to be private, and the public life that we lead together.

A strict division between politics and faith works fine as long as we're dogmatic about insisting that faith is indeed a strictly personal and private affair. But we all know that matters of faith tend to have a way of getting into the public realm, the realm of politics. What to think of a public school in Toronto giving time during school hours to allow an imam to lead four hundred school kids in Friday prayers? What to think of a nineteen-year-old Nova Scotia kid getting suspended from school because he is wearing a yellow T-shirt that reads "Life is wasted without Jesus"? What to think of legislation—repealed in Canada and under a great deal of debate in America—that limits marriage to heterosexual couples? What to think of the courts ordering the town council of Bancroft, Ontario, to stop opening meetings by reciting the Lord's Prayer? Needless to say, I could go on. In each of these situations, faith and politics collide. The reason they do is twofold. First, in each of these cases, there is a refusal on the part of people of faith to acknowledge that their faith is a purely private matter. And second, this refusal becomes an issue because faith commitments in contemporary Western societies are fractured. People with different religions—as well as many folks not espousing any particular religion—live side by side, and their faith commitments clash as soon as they enter the public realm of politics.

The usual way in which, with increasing regularity, we resolve these kinds of issues is largely pre-determined by the way in which the language of "politics" and of "faith" functions in our society. We all know what we're talking about when we're discussing "politics and faith in a fractured world"—or, at least, so we think. What that means is that the way in which these collisions between politics and faith (between public and private) get resolved is generally fairly predictable. To the degree that private faith convictions are seen to transgress the boundaries of public, political life, our immediate sympathy tends to go out to those who are trying to keep faith convictions out of the public realm. We intuitively recoil at the notion of particular

religious groups imposing their private religious and moral viewpoints in the public realm, especially since doing so in a pluralist society—one with competing religious convictions—causes inevitable tension and conflict. As a result, the practical issues involved in our debates surrounding politics and faith tend to get resolved in a rather predictable manner. Viewpoints that stem from overtly religious commitments are considered private and should thus be *kept* private. (That's not always the case. For instance, the nineteen-year-old kid with his allegedly offensive T-shirt got to wear his T-shirt in school, to the chagrin of the school administration. But generally, the line taken by "public" authorities such as the courts and governments tends to be predictable.)

I have purposely begun by drawing your attention to the narrow constraints of these types of debates as a result of the very particular way we often define "politics" and "faith." But these constraints may no longer appear quite so self-evident once we recognize that the terms "politics," "faith," and "fractured world" are open to multiple interpretations. That we can fill the contents of these terms in different ways should be clear from the fact that the kinds of discussions we tend to have about faith and politics—along with their generally predictable outcomes—haven't taken place in the same manner at all times and in all places. The restrictions placed on women in many Arabic countries derive from strongly held faith commitments that have public repercussions. The limitation that in Canada used to be placed on divorce, limiting it to reasons of adultery, cruelty, and desertion, was very much the result of Christian views regarding the indissolubility of marriage, and this intrusion of faith in politics held in Canada until 1968. In other words, when we look beyond the confines of a typically modern society—either by turning to non-Western societies or to our own Christian past—we see that the relationship between politics and faith can function in a variety of ways, and that not all societies resolve them the way we often do in Canada, the

US, and Western Europe today. I think it's a good thing to remind ourselves of the fact that the meaning of the terms in our conference theme is by no means predetermined, and that the way in which we use them says a great deal about how we tend to resolve practical issues that we deal with on a day-to-day basis.

So, please indulge me as I engage in a bit of an exercise of deconstruction in connection with our conference theme. In doing so, I want to focus on the expression of a "fractured world." Both by way of training and by way of conviction I come to this as a theologian. And when I hear that the topic is "politics and faith in a *fractured* world"—politics and faith in a broken, cracked, or splintered world—I cannot help but think that we are dealing here with a less than ideal situation. To put it more up front, to belong to a fractured world is to belong to a world that in some way has lost its wholeness, its oneness, its unity. The problem is that of Humpty Dumpty:

Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall;  
Humpty Dumpty had a great fall.  
All the king's horses and all the  
king's men  
Couldn't put Humpty together again.

Most theologians acknowledge Humpty Dumpty's "great fall," and they recognize the fracturing that has occurred.

One of my favourite theologians is the twentieth-century Catholic patristic scholar, Henri de Lubac (1896–1991).<sup>1</sup> De Lubac was keenly aware of the fact that, theologically speaking, the fall introduced brokenness, fracturing. He gained this insight especially from the church fathers and medieval authors, whom he read ferociously in the 1930s. One of the initial and (I think) most delicious fruits of de Lubac's extensive reading program came in his 1938 book, *Catholicisme: Les Aspects sociaux du dogme*, which translates as *Catholicism: The Social Aspects of Dogma*.<sup>2</sup> In what follows, I want to trace the first part of de Lubac's book, seeing as it has a great deal of light to shed on the question of what we understand

by a "fractured world" and on how we deal with this brokenness.

First I should say that in important ways, de Lubac's world is not ours. De Lubac's book is best seen as a sustained attack on a form of Catholicism, prevalent in the 1930s, which he characterizes as individualistic.<sup>3</sup> He is concerned with a view of Christianity that doesn't look beyond the salvation of the individual. The reason one goes to Mass, on this common, individualist approach, is to take the body of Christ in the Eucharist, and so get saved. On this view, Christ "promised salvation not to communities but to individuals."<sup>4</sup> De Lubac counters this individualist mindset by showing from the church fathers and medieval theologians that Christianity is a social religion that runs counter to any and all individualism and escapism. The Catholic world of the 1930s is not ours today—though we also continuously need to be on guard against different forms of individualism both in our culture and in our churches.

The first part of de Lubac's book is probably the most important one, and it is certainly the most relevant to our topic. Countering the individualism that he detects within the Catholic tradition and making a plea for the social character of the Christian faith, de Lubac does essentially two things. First, he shows that the human race, in its basic character, is one. That is to say, it was created as one, and its destiny is to be united. So, he shows the unity of humanity. Second, he makes clear that this unity lies anchored in Jesus Christ. De Lubac has a strong aversion against any attempts to discuss who we are as human beings apart from Jesus Christ. For de Lubac, if you want to know what it means to be human, you look to Christ. Put somewhat differently, we could say this: one cannot understand the created order and what people are up to in this world apart from the gospel of Jesus Christ. So, two things: (1) humanity is one, and (2) this oneness is truly realized and revealed in Christ. In what follows, I will unpack how de Lubac works with these two basic points, and after that I will turn to a

few implications for the question of “politics and faith in a fractured world.”

De Lubac begins his first chapter by making a basic point about the relationship between nature and the supernatural. He comments:

The supernatural dignity of one who has been baptized rests, we know, on the natural dignity of man, though it surpasses it in an infinite manner: *agnosce, christiane, dignitatem tuam—Deus qui humanae substantiae dignitatem mirabiliter condidisti.* [Recognize, O Christian, your dignity—God, who in a wonderful manner created and ennobled human nature.] Thus the unity of the Mystical Body of Christ, a supernatural unity, supposes a previous natural unity, the unity of the human race.<sup>5</sup>

According to de Lubac, our supernatural dignity is based on our natural dignity. In giving supernatural grace, God builds on his prior gift of our created nature. And so, if it is true that the church (the mystical body of Christ) is one, then we may rightly assume that this unity is based on a prior unity of all humanity, the way that God created us. Humpty Dumpty wasn't fractured from the outset: Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall, and Humpty Dumpty had a great fall. First, he sat on a wall—whole, united, one. Humanity, according to the unanimous consent of the Great Tradition, was one in Adam. Adam was not just one individual—that would imply a rather literalist reading of the Genesis account. No, Adam is you and I; Adam is all human beings wrapped up in one. The fall, therefore, explains de Lubac, was a fall from unity, from oneness: “With the first sin it was this being, whole and entire, which fell away, which was driven out of Paradise and sentenced to a bitter exile.”<sup>6</sup> Or, as the third-century Alexandrian theologian Origen (ca. 185–254) sharply puts it: “*Ubi peccata, ibi multitudo*”—“Where we have sin, there

we have multiplicity.”<sup>7</sup> It is through sin, according to Maximus the Confessor (ca. 580–662), that “the one nature was shattered into a thousand pieces.”<sup>8</sup> Cyril of Alexandria (ca. 376–444) similarly insists that “Satan has broken us up [ἔσκόρπισεν]”;<sup>9</sup> and Augustine comments, as well, “Originally one, he [Adam] has fallen, and, breaking up as it were, he has filled the whole earth with the pieces.”<sup>10</sup> Clearly, mother Monica had been reading Humpty Dumpty to Augustine when he grew up. (As a little aside, despite the dramatic Humpty Dumpty imagery, de Lubac doesn't want us to stretch it. While the fall has indeed ruined the *spiritual* unity of the human race, there still remains, he argues, a *natural* unity.<sup>11</sup> But that's just a little aside. The main point is that Humpty Dumpty had a great fall and lies fractured on the ground.)

Of course, this raises the great theological conundrum of Humpty Dumpty, expressed in the words, “All the king's horses and all the king's men / Couldn't put Humpty together again.” How are we going to get the broken pieces back together again? De Lubac again quotes Augustine: “Divine mercy gathered up the fragments from every side, forged them in the fire of love, and welded into one what had been broken.”<sup>12</sup> Somehow, God in his mercy picks up the pieces and puts them back together again. The question is: how does God do this? De Lubac's answer to this question is straightforwardly christological. Just as all people are included in Adam, so all are included also in Christ. Says de Lubac:

In making a human nature it is *human nature* that he [Christ] united to himself, that he enclosed in himself, and it is the latter, whole and entire, that in some sort he uses as a body. *Naturam in se universae carnis adsumpsit.* [He assumed in himself the nature of all flesh.] Whole and entire he will bear it then to Calvary, whole and entire he will raise it from the dead, whole and

entire he will save it. Christ the Redeemer does not offer salvation merely to each one; he effects it, he is himself the salvation of the whole, and for each one salvation consists in a personal ratification of his original “belonging” to Christ, so that he be not cast out, cut off from this Whole.<sup>13</sup>

Note de Lubac’s repeated emphasis on human nature “whole and entire.” Just as in Adam human nature was created “whole and entire,” so in Christ it also gets *re-created* “whole and entire.”

Those of us familiar with philosophy may pick up certain Platonic echoes here. The notion that humanity once was “whole and entire,” that this original unity has been fractured through a fall into multiplicity, and that the end is like the beginning, a restoration back to our original and essential humanity—all of this sounds like a traditional Platonic *exitus-reditus* scheme, where everything goes out from the One and returns to the One. Fair enough, I should say: if this essay converts any of my readers to Christian Platonism, I certainly won’t complain. Nonetheless, de Lubac actually goes out of his way to suggest that

it’s not Platonic essentialism that leads to this schema. Instead, it is St. John and St. Paul. In John’s Gospel, Caiaphas prophesies as high priest that Jesus had to die for the nation; and the Gospel writer adds, “and not for that nation only, but that also he should gather together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad” (John 11:52 KJV). “Gather together into one” (συναγάγη) is the language John uses. Similarly, St. Paul portrays Christ as the one who makes peace, gathering together

disunited portions of creation by breaking down the middle wall of partition (Eph. 2:14). De Lubac quotes the famous Pauline text of Ephesians 1:10, which in the late second century was Irenaeus’s favourite, and which claims that in the fullness of time God would “gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth” (KJV). This “gathering together” (ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι), this “recapitulation” or “restoration” of all things into one, takes place, Paul says, in Christ. And de Lubac then turns to the Pauline language of Christ as the “new man” (Eph. 2:15; 4:24; Col. 3:10–11; cf. Col 1:20), which the apostle identifies with the one body of the church, as he speaks of “one new man ... in one body” (Eph. 2:15–16). This “new man” is also the “new creature” (Gal. 6:15; 2 Cor. 5:17) or the “perfect man” (Eph. 4:13), into whose fullness we mature.<sup>14</sup>

All this implies, for de Lubac, that the catholicity or universality of the church is, in a real sense, identical with Christ himself.<sup>15</sup> Because the unity and universality of the church are given with Christ, it is in and through the church that God is going to restore humanity’s original wholeness. It is through the church that Christ is going to put Humpty Dumpty together again. And so, de Lubac comments: “Humanity is one, organically one by its divine structure; it is the Church’s mission to reveal to men that pristine unity that they have lost, to restore and complete it.”<sup>16</sup> This implies that as an organization, the church is the *means* that leads us back to unity, while as united to Christ, the church is the *very end*, the *purpose* of everything. The church, we could say, is Humpty Dumpty back together again, sitting high on the wall. And de Lubac claims it is particularly the sacraments that lead us back to this final unity of the church in Christ as the one, whole, new man.<sup>17</sup>

De Lubac began his discussion with saying that all humanity was created as “whole and entire” in Adam. At the end of his discussion, when he talks about eternal life, he shows that the Great Tradition tended to look at eternal life as simply the

*Just as in Adam human nature was created “whole and entire,” so in Christ it also gets re-created “whole and entire.”*

restoration of this same “whole and entire” humanity, but now in and through Christ and the church. St. Paul, de Lubac insists, “could see the course of human history as it progressed toward its end: the liberation of all creation, the consummation of all things in the unity of the Body of Christ now fully perfected. The hope he implanted in the hearts of those he won for Christ was, it can be said with certainty, a cosmic one.”<sup>18</sup> Salvation, according to de Lubac, is never the salvation of just the individual; it is always the salvation of the human race together. The subtitle of the English translation of de Lubac’s book reads *Christ and the Common Destiny of Man*.<sup>19</sup> De Lubac never addresses head on whether he thinks this implies the final universal salvation of every individual—though at times he appears to come close to such universalism.<sup>20</sup> His overall approach, of course, tends in that direction, since the church is simply all of humanity, reunited into one in Christ.<sup>21</sup> De Lubac finally offers this thought: “Whatever is revealed on this subject at the Last Day one thing is certain: the Church will not enter maimed into the Kingdom.”<sup>22</sup> De Lubac’s logic is that of a Christian Platonist. The original unity of humanity has been fractured; Humpty Dumpty has made a great fall. For de Lubac, Christ is not just the one who does what all the king’s horses and all the king’s men are unable to do; Christ not only puts Humpty Dumpty together again; rather, if I may say so reverently, he *is* Humpty Dumpty. According to the Christian story, then, when we see Humpty Dumpty back on the wall, we see ourselves, in Christ, also back on the wall.

Now, it may seem as though with all this focus on the topic of “fragmentation,” I have strayed rather far from the topic we started out with. So let me bring this back to the other two elements of the conference theme, to the question of politics and faith. It seems to me that we can draw at least three lessons from de Lubac’s approach. First, when as Christians we think about politics, the worst thing to do would be to bracket

our Christian commitments. De Lubac’s approach is christological from beginning to end. If it is true, as de Lubac suggests, that the future of society and of the world depends on Christ—that Christ is the one who, through the church, is going to put Humpty Dumpty together again—then the main thing Christians ought to do is to claim unashamedly that the healing of our fractured society depends on the “new humanity,” that is to say, on the church in Jesus Christ. Politics, then, gets reconfigured in this unabashedly Christian account of things. The politics that holds our primary allegiance and devotion is not the politics of the nation state. If Christ is the one who on the last day draws all humanity to himself, then the common good that our politics aims for is the supernatural end of the unity of this new humanity in Jesus Christ. This places the church at the forefront of our political attention. The *polis*—the city—to which we are committed without reserve is the *polis* of the church, because it is that *polis* that is the initial embodiment of the eternal city that Revelation 21 tells us is coming down from heaven.

Put negatively, this means that if we are really interested in getting Humpty Dumpty back on the wall, we cannot possibly give our ultimate allegiance to the secular nation state. Whatever the pros and cons of liberal democracy—the particular, recent arrangement of secular politics to which modernity has given birth—it cannot possibly claim our ultimate allegiance. The final end of society is to put Humpty Dumpty together again, and that is something Christ does through his church; it is not something that secular politics, whatever shape or form it may take, can ever do. What is more, this primary allegiance to the *polis* of the church also implies that to the degree that the habits, customs, laws, and norms of our society move away from our ecclesial loyalties, to that same degree Christians will feel called to separate themselves from commitments, associations, and ways of life that are common fare in the world around us—and,

perhaps, to speak prophetically into those contemporary social configurations.

Perhaps these comments create a degree of nervousness among some. Let me be clear, therefore, that I am not turning into a Yoderian or Hauerwassian theologian. I am not pleading for a separation from the nation state on principle. In fact, in many ways, I am quite sympathetic to the task of “defending Constantine,” something that Peter Leithart has done so eloquently in his recent book.<sup>23</sup> I am simply refusing to accept the argument that our primary allegiance lies with liberal democracy or with the nation state. Christ is the one who puts Humpty Dumpty back together again, and that simple fact puts the lie to the idea that there is a neutral, common ground to which we ought to commit ourselves regardless of what, in actual fact, the particular ends of such a society may be. Faith is not a private afterthought that we cobble together once we have the main basis of our public common life already in place. Rather, the church is a thoroughly *public* space. The church’s claims of faith are grandiose; in fact, for many today they must seem preposterous. After all, on de Lubac’s view, the church is no longer just one of many private organizations that contributes to societal well-being; rather, the church *is* the new society, and as the new society, the church is keen to share her way of life with those who don’t acknowledge her grandiose claims, always with an eye to the ultimate goal of seeing Humpty Dumpty back together again.

Second, this christological starting point means that when Christians look beyond the boundaries of the church, they regard unity and catholicity, rather than brokenness and fracturing—usually disguised under terms such as “pluralism” or “multiculturalism”—as conducive to secular politics. Since the 1960s, multiculturalism has turned into a near-sacred Canadian commitment. It has become almost impossible to be a good Canadian without at the same time holding to the ultimate good of multiculturalism. But, as John Stackhouse rightly observes, “much multiculturalism in

both attitude and program has had the effect of encouraging people to concentrate upon their own ethnicity, their own difference, so as to separate them from the whole.”<sup>24</sup> And he goes on to say that the result is “a multiplicity of cultures that strains the unity of the society that comprises them as each focuses upon its own good according to its own lights.”<sup>25</sup> Jens Zimmermann echoes this sentiment when he points out in his recent book *Incarnational Humanism* that increasingly in Western Europe politicians are recognizing the dead end into which multiculturalism has led us.<sup>26</sup>

About two years ago, Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, commented, as she spoke about the reality of the many guest-workers Germany has attracted since the 1960s: “We kidded ourselves a while. We said: They won’t stay. Some time, they’ll be gone. But this isn’t reality, and of course, the approach to build a *multikulti* society, to happily live side by side with each other, this approach has failed, utterly failed.” More importantly, Merkel then added the following: “We feel tied to Christian values. ... Those who don’t accept them don’t have a place here.” Note carefully what Merkel does and doesn’t say here. She is not making an argument for the imposition of the Christian faith. What she is doing, however, is stating that our political life together—and with this she means the political life of the nation state—isn’t value free. She rightly claims that many of our societal values stem from the Christian tradition and that multiculturalism inevitably bumps up against this basic, stubborn fact.

Merkel’s approach is particularly relevant, of course, in Western Europe today, seeing that demographic trends make for difficult times ahead for Christians while favouring the future of Muslim flourishing and in some instances Islamic hegemony. The situation both in Canada and in America is quite different. Still, on both sides of the Atlantic over the past number of decades, we have favoured multiplicity over unity. Perhaps we need to recall Origen’s comment: “*Ubi peccata, ibi*

*multitudo*”—“Where we have sin, there we have multiplicity.” To live in a fractured world is to live in a world in which Humpty Dumpty has made a great fall.<sup>27</sup> It seems to me one of the great banes, therefore, of our postmodern sensibilities is that we have come to favour multiplicity over unity, fragmentation over catholicity.

I recognize that the argument I have just made can be abused. Appeals to unity can be twisted so as to advocate oppression, dictatorship, tyranny, or fascism. Unity is not the same as uniformity, and unity does not preclude diversity. But it seems to me that the possible abuse of my appeal for unity should be recognized for what it is: abuse. I am not making a plea for some kind of abstract unity. In that case, we would circle right back to a kind of neutrally conceived concept of politics, this time centred on the sameness of tyranny instead of on the fracturing of multiculturalism. No, the topic at hand isn't just “Politics in a Fractured World”; it is “Politics *and Faith* in a Fractured World.” Our aim of putting Humpty Dumpty together again implies a plea for a distinctly Christian and a robustly ecclesial approach to politics. By always pointing to Christ as both the origin and the aim of all human existence, it seems to me that we can rightly alleviate fears of violent, fundamentalist suppression of the rich diversity of human life. Of course, Christians also have, on many occasions, abused and are still liable to abuse their restored identity in Christ. Notwithstanding any shameful actions on the part of Christians, I think we can make an eminent empirical case that Christian commitments lead to a more wholesome social life together than anything else that has been on offer in the past or that is on offer in other cultures around the world today.<sup>28</sup>

One final lesson from de Lubac, and this concerns our posture in connection with the cultural and religious clashes that we witness in America and, increasingly, it seems, also in Canada. It is nothing short of disastrous for Humpty Dumpty's con-

dition when Christians single-mindedly, angrily, and with a loss of respect and love for neighbour do whatever it takes to restore cultural conditions amenable to people of faith. By all means, we ought to get involved in secular politics. By all means, we should aim to undo the fracturing that so characterizes contemporary society. But the posture should be one of hope, not one of frustration or perhaps even despair.<sup>29</sup> In an important sense, it is Christ, not you and I, who puts Humpty Dumpty back together again. After all, as I said, reverently put, he *is* Humpty Dumpty. And while it is true that you and I may identify with Christ, the final aim of the fullness of the kingdom depends not on our political or cultural endeavours; the eschaton is going to be marked by a radical in-breaking from above and will lead to a kingdom that is unlike any political structure that we put together this side of history.

What is more, if it is true that our primary allegiance is to the church and not to the liberal democracy of the contemporary nation state, this means that we take what happens in the nation state a lot less seriously than otherwise we might. Secular politics is by no means an indifferent issue. But, as Oliver O'Donovan has rightly argued, the coming of Christ has clipped the wings of secular government. To expect salvation from secular politics is to make a category mistake. “All the king's horses and all the king's men / Couldn't put Humpty together again.” After all, secular government *only* deals with today's world, with the realities of the *saeculum*. That's why we call them “secular.” The Latin *saeculum* refers to this age, as opposed to the age to come. As O'Donovan puts it: “Secular institutions have a role confined to the passing age (*saeculum*). They do not represent the arrival of the new age and the rule of God. ... The corresponding term to ‘secular’ is not ‘sacred,’ nor ‘spiritual,’ but ‘eternal.’”<sup>30</sup> Secular politics is limited in its reach. Christian hope, therefore, is focused not on secular politics; it aims much higher: it aims at the fullness of Christ (Eph. 1:23; 4:13; Col. 1:19; 2:9–10). He is the one who puts Humpty Dumpty together again. **X**

**Notes**

1 For introductions to de Lubac's theology, see Susan K. Wood, *Spiritual Exegesis and the Church in the Theology of Henri de Lubac* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998); David Grumett, *De Lubac: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: T&T Clark / Continuum, 2007); Rudolf Voderholzer, *Meet Henri de Lubac*, trans. Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2008).

2 The English translation uses a different subtitle: Henri de Lubac, *Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man*, trans. Lancelot C. Sheppard and Elizabeth Englund (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1988).

3 Cf. Bryan C. Hollon, *Everything Is Sacred: Spiritual Exegesis in the Political Theology of Henri de Lubac* (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2009), 46–54.

4 De Lubac, *Catholicism*, 15.

5 *Ibid.*, 25.

6 *Ibid.*, 26–27.

7 Origen, *In Ezech.*, hom. 9, no. 1. Quoted in de Lubac, *Catholicism*, 33.

8 Maximus the Confessor, *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*, covering letter (PG 90, 256). Quoted in de Lubac, *Catholicism*, 33.

9 Cyril of Alexandria, *In Joan.*, lib. 7 (PG 74, 69). Quoted in de Lubac, *Catholicism*, 34.

10 Augustine, *In Psalm. 95*, no. 15 (PL 37, 1236). Quoted in de Lubac, *Catholicism*, 34.

11 De Lubac, *Catholicism*, 33.

12 Augustine, *In Psalm. 58*, no. 10 (PL 36, 698). Quoted in de Lubac, *Catholicism*, 35–36.

13 De Lubac, *Catholicism*, 38–39.

14 *Ibid.*, 40–47.

15 For de Lubac's ecclesiology, see Hans Boersma, *Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 244–65.

16 De Lubac, *Catholicism*, 53.

17 *Ibid.*, 82–111.

18 *Ibid.*, 120.

19 For the use of this subtitle, see *ibid.*, 140–41, 222, 232, 299, 353.

20 See, e.g., de Lubac's comment that “humanity is made up of persons who have all the same one eternal destiny, in whatever category or century their birth has placed them” (*ibid.*, 232).

21 *Ibid.*, 279.

22 *Ibid.*, 279–80.

23 Peter J. Leithart, *Defending Constantine: The Twilight of an Empire and the Dawn of Christendom* (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2010).

24 John G. Stackhouse, “Postmodernity and Postmodernism(s),” in *Humble Apologetics: Defending the Faith Today* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 35.

25 *Ibid.*

26 Jens Zimmermann, *Incarnational Humanism: A Philosophy of Culture for the Church in the World* (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2012).

27 Cf. this comment by Brad S. Gregory: “Who are ‘we’ given the realities of Western life in the early twenty-first century? More fundamentally, what would be best for human beings as such a way of life? Such questions become progressively more problematic as pluralism proliferates within the very institutions that enable it, and without any persuasive arguments to contain it based on ‘public reason’” (*The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularizes Society* [Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012], 188).

28 Cf. Mark Noll, “Have Christians Done More Harm Than Good?” In *Must Christianity Be Violent? Reflections on History, Practice, and Theology*, ed. Kenneth R. Chase and Alan Jacobs (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2003), 70–93.

29 Cf. Robin Lovin, *Christian Realism and the New Realities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

30 Oliver O’Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 211.